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Initially, Thomas More’s Utopia makes us expect that we’ll be presented with a depiction of 
unknown lands and peoples, in the style of the Florentine voyager Amerigo Vespucci’s 
Quattuor navigationes. The setting is this: In the garden of the same Antwerp inn where, in the 
summer of 1515, Thomas More lodged during his short visit to his Dutch friend Petr Giles, a 
certain Rafael Hythlodaios joins the two companions. This fictional character is there to tell 
the two humanists about the isle of Utopia where he arrived in the course of the fourth of 
Vespucci’s expeditions and where he could see with his own eyes every thing he is going to 
narrate. First he will describe the reception given to the group of travellers that have remained 
on the isle; next he will report on the Utopian political constitution and mores. But before all 
of this takes place, More the author inserts the conversation that first brought the three 
personages to a mention of the isle. 
Here the book launches a completely novel area of investigation; namely, the relationship 
between philosophy and politics, or more precisely, the issue whether the philosopher ought to 
become the counsellor of the prince -- the prominently Humanist inquiry as to how the 
contemplative life ought to be linked to the life of action. As the conversation proceeds, 
Hythlodaios and More come to a disagreement concerning the role of philosophy in politics. 
Whereas Hythlodaios opines that at the courts of rulers there is no place for philosophy, More 
believes the very opposite. In More’s own words, the two positions can be stated as follows: 
 
 at rulers’ courts there is no place “for this school philosophy (philosophia scholastica) 
which supposes every topic suitable for every occasion” (p. 95); however, there is 
place for “another (alia) philosophy, better suited for the role of citizen, that takes its 
cue, adapts itself to the drama in hand and acts part neatly and appropriately” (p. 97).1 
                                                 
1 The Latin original and the English translation are quoted after More: Utopia, edited by George M. Logan - 
Robert M. Adams - Clarence H. Miller, Cambridge University Press 2006 (first published 1995). The 
translation of the Utopia in this edition is based on the Norton Critical Edition of Utopia by Sir Thomas More, 
translated and edited by Robert M. Adams. 
 As we shall see, the two philosophies -- the one of the schools and the “other one” -- differ not 
only in their relationship to politics but also in their approach to common and private property. 
In order to grasp well the above-quoted passage and the significance of More’s polemics with 
Hythlodaios, a polemics that touches the very grounds of the utopian way of life, i.e. social 
equality and abolition of private property, it needs to be clarified what position is adopted here 
by More the author. As the person who wrote Utopia, More may be presenting the objections 
mentioned either, (A), merely as a sceptical rider as to the chances of transforming Utopia into 
reality and as to the legitimacy of the idea of equality and common ownership; or (B), as the 
expression of the author’s essential dissent from the notion of such a social arrangement. 
As is clear from the Latin title, De optimo reipublicae statu, deque nova insula Utopia, 
the topic on which the book of Utopia focuses is the best arrangement of society and the 
newly discovered isle. The whole text is constructed along a twin principle, and it splits into 
two main parts that can be almost considered two separate books. Whereas the former of the 
two depicts the disastrous state of society in 16th century England, the latter describes the 
perfect life lived at the opposite end of the Earth.2 Equally the genesis of the Utopia points to 
two separate periods of time and to two distinct places. According to Erasmus’s testimony, 
More wrote the part about the Utopian way of life during his 1515 stay in Antwerp;3 only after 
his return to England he then elaborated the critique of the current state of the country, the 
Preface4 and the conclusion.5  
A similar split can be detected in the course of More’s own life. From 1501-1505 he 
sought to escape the “cruel and inhuman” world by means of an ascetic existence behind the 
walls of a monastery, with members of the Cartusian Order,6 yet afterwards he became a 
                                                 
2 Cf. T. I. White, The Key to Nowhere: Pride and Utopia, in: J. Olin (ed.), Interpreting Thomas More's 
“Utopia”, New York 1989, p. 38. F. Seebohm claims that Book I presents a response to Henry III’s offer of 
the post of a Justice, whereas Book II forms a contrast to the situation in Europe at the time;  cf. The Oxford 
Reforms: Colet, Erasmus, and More [1867], ed. H. E. Seebohm, New York 1914, p. 92. 
3 The isle of the sages was supposed to form a counterpoint to the land of fools; cf. Erasmus of Rotterdam, 
Praise of Folly. 
4 A version of the Preface might have been drafted already in Antwerp, since in the first edition the epistle 
bears the title Prefatio in opus de optimo reipublicae statu, so that it might have represented an introduction to 
the treatise on Utopia (G. M. Logan, The Meaning of More’s „Utopia“, Princeton 1983, p. 14, fn. 13). 
5 Erasmus of Rotterdam, Epistles, vol. III, p. 398 (a letter to Ulrich von Hutten from 23 July 1517; cf. G. M. 
Logan, The Meaning of More's “Utopia”, p. 11-12. 
6 Cf. W. Roper, The Life of Sir Thomas More. In Two Early Tudor Lives, vyd. R. S. Sylvester - D. P. Harding, 
London 1962, p. 198. 
highly successful London barrister and attains the office of Lord Chancellor. Still, he 
remained in opposition to unlimited papal power, as he believed that the Pope is subject to 
the power of the church council, as well as unlimited power of the prince -- the King; 
consequentially, he refused to accept the Sovereignty Act, which brought him to the Tower 
prison and eventually to the executioner’s platform.7 This conflict between the ancient and 
the new, between medieval contemplation and humanist action, informs also the eventual 
shape of the Utopia. In this work and elsewhere, More is waging a war with himself. At first, 
he seeks the solution in one direction only; however, as is apparent from his attitude to the 
Utopian way of life, eventually he succeeds in overcoming the conflict. It is here that we find 
his message to the Humanists, one not limited to a mere re-exposition of the Humanist 
orthodoxy.8 
It is true that soon after its publication More’s Utopia became the paradigm of a new 
literary genre as well as of an argumentative and theoretical pattern, employed then primarily 
in the 17th--19th centuries, and that many contemporary commentators still view it as a 
seriously intended project of human existence bare of social tensions as well as of private 
possessions. Yet, a number of passages in the book can induce us to acknowledge that Utopia 
is not a utopian work, if that should mean that the author of the work personally identifies with 
the guiding ideas of the Utopians’ existence. Our scepticism concerning the notion that More’s 
supposed utopian project is meant seriously is based on, first, the author’s attitude to the 
principal character; second, on an interpretation of the dialogue that confronts More’s and 
Hythlodaios’s views; and finally, on More’s commentary in the conclusion.9 
Doubts about the significance and the intention of More’s book turned up as soon as it 
was published in 1516 in Louvain. There is no agreement on an overall reading. Whereas J.H. 
Hexter views the book as a seriously minded description of an ideal society, Dexter perceives 
in it a derisive satire of a “repulsive” state order. Logan considers it an extraordinarily 
                                                 
7 Having refused to acknowledge the sovereignty of Henry VIII in the spiritual sphere, More was tried for high 
treason and eventually executed on July 6, 1535. 
8 Cf. G. M. Logan, The Meaning of More's “Utopia”, p. 25. 
9 The just cited dialogue is part of a conversation which, as stated above, is inserted by the author shortly after 
More-the-character invites Hythlodaios to tell the story of the unknown peoples and lands from his last sea 
voyage. The exchange, thematically focused on philosophy and politics, forms the end of Part I. The 
concluding commentary then follows upon Hythlodaios’s presentation of the crucial features of the Utopian 
way of life, in Part II, and is not dialogical. It is a critical, polemical note on the constitution established on 
the isle of Utopia. 
 
complex work of political philosophy.10 Karl Kautsky finds More’s Utopia a source of proto-
Communist ideas.11 According to C.S. Lewis, the book is a satirical fiction, while to R.S. 
Sylvestr it offers a complex criticism of the principal speaker, Rafael Hythlodaios.12 H. G. 
Wells points out the thematic differences between the two main parts of the work and claims it 
to be “one of the most profoundly inconsistent of books”.13 There are many indications that 
the ambiguity of the overall significance of the book and the tension between the two thematic 
areas stem from the author’s intention.14 
 The so-called Humanist Reading,15 rooted in the historical context and represented by 
commentators such as E.L. Surtz, F. Caspari, J.H. Hexter, R.J. Schoeck and Q. Skinner, is 
among the most influential present-day interpretations. The shared element is that its 
proponents set More’s Utopia within the Humanist context. Skinner, for instance, believes 
the Utopia to be a contribution to a more general “programme” of Humanist reforms, while 
Shoeck sees the work as a “model that makes it possible to realize the reforms”.16 A prime 
opponent of such a reading is G.M. Logan, who detects defamatory language in the Utopia 
and notes its dialogical composition, its inconsistence, the authorial irony, and the distance 
adopted to the Utopian community. It is also well to notice his remark that Plato’s Republic is 
full of inconsistencies, and thus -- in Logan’s view -- “the ideal polis is not seriously 
intended”.17 
                                                 
10 J. H. Hexter, More's “Utopia”: The Bibliography of an Idea, New York 1952, 1965, p. 57; Allen T. S. 
Dorsch, Sir Thomas More and Lucian, in: Archiv für das Studium der Neueren Sprachen und Literaturen, 
203, 1966-1977, p. 362; G. M. Logan, The Meaning of More's “Utopia”,  p. 9.  
11 Cf. K. Kautsky, Thomas More und seine Utopie, Berlin 1926. 
12 Cf. C. S. Lewis, Oxford History of English Literature, s.v. “Utopia”. R. S. Sylvestr, Essential Articles for 
the Study of Thomas More, Hamden 1977. 
13 H. G. Wells, Introduction, in: Utopia, New York 1935. 
14 A similar idea is expressed by Hexter, who writes in the Yale edition that the greatness of the book “lies not 
in its harmony but in its intensity”; cf. More's “Utopia”: The Bibliography of an Idea, New York 1952, p. 
XXVII. 
15 The phrase was coined by one of the reading’s proponents, E. L. Surtz, in his The Praise of Pleasure: 
Philosophy, Education, and Communism in More's “Utopia”, Cambridge (Mass.) 1957, p. 2-8, as well as The 
Praise of Wisdom: A Commentary on the Religious and Moral Problems and Backgrounds of St. Thomas More's 
“Utopia”, Chicago 1957, p. 12. 
16 Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, I, Cambridge 1978, pp. 255-256, 261; R. J. 
Schoeck, “A Nursery of Correct and Useful Institutions”: On Reading More's “Utopia” as Dialogue, in: 
Moreana, 22, 1969, pp. 19-32. 
17 Cf. G. M. Logan, The Meaning of More's “Utopia”, pp. 1-31; on Plato cf. p. 31, n. 15. For the view that the 
best regime, as outlined in Book Five of Plato’s Republic, is for Plato a subject of criticism, cf. e.g. A. Havlíček, 
Die Kritik Platons an Glaukons Auffassung des besten Staates im V. Buch der „Politeia“, in: A. Havlíček - F. 
Karfík (vyd.), The ,Republic` and the ,Laws` of Plato, Praha 1998, pp. 46-66; idem, Ist die “gerechte” Handlung 
gerecht?, in: D. Barbaric (vyd.), Platon über das Gute und die Gerechtigkeit, Würzburg 2005, pp. 9-20. 
In what follows, and developing some of Logan’s ideas, I will try to show that More’s 
Utopia is not a utopian treatise and that More’s attitude to the Utopian way of life, as depicted 
by Hythlodaios, is critical rather than anything else. We shall also examine both the theoretical 
assumptions behind the Utopian constitution and the premises of More’s critique. First we 
shall turn to the Preface, where the author talks about his own role in the book, and to the 
character of Hythlodaios as the key advocate of the life led on the isle of Utopia. Then we’ll 
analyze the dialogue captured by Part I of the Utopia, as it discusses the presuppositions 
adopted by each participant in the debate. The conclusion summarizes our analysis. 
 
The significance of the Preface 
 
The Preface characterizes all the main characters of Utopia -- that is, Hythlodaios, More and 
Giles -- and it also mentions the isle of Utopia for the first time. More tells Giles (“Aegidus” 
in Latin) that, a year after the event, he is sending him a manuscript of his book, and asks him 
to arrange that Hythlodaios could read it, as he, More, should not like to omit anything true or 
include anything untrue in Hythlodaios’s story. However, More also distantiates himself from 
the contents of the book, as he insists that he merely repeats whatever he, together with Giles, 
heard Hythlodaios say. In the circumstances, “truth” means a faithful report on what was said 
and implies no positive stance toward its content. As for his own contribution to the image 
offered here of life on the isle of Utopia, More describes it as follows: 
„For, as I've taken particular pains to avoid having anything false in the book, so, if 
anything is in doubt, I'd rather say something untrue than tell a lie. In short, I'd rather 
be honest than clever (quod malim bonus esse quam prudens).” (p. 35) 
 
Even though More does want to capture the story told by Hythlodaios and the life of 
Utopians as faithfully as possible, that does not mean he admires it uncritically. His 
objections against Hythlodaios’s presentation will be stated in the course of the discussion in 
Part I, those against the Utopian way of life both in Part I and at the end of Part II. Still, it is 
with surprise that we encounter his admission of ignorance as to where the isle of Utopia 
actually is. We would expect him to note every detail, obviously including the name of the 
sea where the island is situated -- and yet he has no idea as to the geographic position of the 
isle and does not even appear interested in this piece of information. 
As for More’s image of particular characters, what he has to say about Rafael 
Hythlodaios is critical through and through. While More certainly respects and admires some 
of Hythlodaios’s attitudes and views, he considers Hythlodaios less than well-spoken and 
lacking genuine erudition in either Latin or Greek. That is why, so More, his speech 
approaches “unsearched-for simplicity”. The author’s view of the Portuguese voyager comes 
to the fore also in the choice of Rafael’s surname, “Hythlodaios”. The key that would 
decipher the name can be provided only by familiarity with Ancient Greek.18 It is composed 
of the Greek vocables hythlos, which is to say “idle talk, nonsense”, and daios (from daiein), 
i.e. “experienced, knowing, capable”. In English, Rafael Hythlodaios means as much as 
Rafael Windbag. Such a choice of name -- an intentional one, no doubt -- disturbs the 
respectability of everything the character is going to say, including his views concerning the 
Utopian way of life. 
The humorous and ironical note of the Preface is complemented by other Greek 
neologisms: besides the name of Hythlodaios, the text mentions words such as Amaurotum 
(from amauros, dark, obscure), Anytrus (from anydros / anydria, arid / aridity) or Utopia 
(from ou-topos, what lacks a place: Nowhereland or Nowhereburg). In a similar way, More 
engages in wordplay by using English neologisms for the Utopian offices. The Czech 
translator of Utopia, B. Ryba, made a unique attempt to decipher the significance of some of 
More’s witticisms in Part II. For instance, as we detach the affix -tus from the Latin-looking 
syphograntus and read the resulting syphogran backwards, it turns out the talk is of a “nark 
office” (= “the office of spying and prying”). By a similar procedure, traniboros produces 
“rabbi nark”, i.e., “the chief officer of spying”.19 
All the elements listed above -- i.e., the author’s distantiation from the content of 
Hythlodaios’s ideas; his lack of interest in more detailed information concerning the isle; the 
claim that all he does is a faithful reproduction of whatever was said; the ridicule by which 
                                                 
18 Even though knowledge of Ancient Greek did assure respect and good standing, at the beginning of the 16th 
century it was not common among the Humanists; cf. More: Utopia, ed. by G. M. Logan et al., p. 31, fn. 7.  
19 Cf. B. Ryba, De Thomae Mori vocabulis Utopianis, in: Charisteria Thaddaeo Sinko oblata, Varsaviae - 
Wratislaviae 1951, pp. 289 f. The traditional explanations of syphograntus and traniboros, derived from 
ancient Greek, lack proper backing. The first term can mean either “the ruler of a pig sty” (from Greek 
sypheos, a pig sty, and krantor, a ruler), or again “a wise elder” (from Greek sophos and geron). The latter 
term could mean “the master eater” (from Greek traneis or tranos, sharp, bright, and boros, insatiable, 
hungry). Cf.  More: Utopia, ed. by G. M. Logan et al.,  p. 121, n. 21; Utopia by Sir Thomas More, tr. by R. 
the main character is smeared; and the pervasive irony -- indicate a gap between the author’s 
own position and the subsequent exposition, first and foremost the ideas presented by 
Hythlodaios. In the next part, we shall examine the roots of More’s critical objections to 
Hythlodaios’s views and the assumptions or attitudes on which Hythlodaios’s and More’s 
respective positions are based. 
 
The dialogical sequence in Part I of the Utopia 
 
After the Preface, it is primarily the polemical part of the whole exchange in Part I of the 
Utopia that allows us to demonstrate More’s critical stand to Hythlodaios. The exchange is 
set off by Giles’ question as to why Hythlodaios will not offer his services to the King, given 
he is so learned and knowledgeable about lands and peoples, and it closes upon the demand 
that Hythlodaios depict the mores, arrangements, laws and such on the isle of Utopia. For 
Giles is entranced by Hythlodaios’s knowledge of the lands his friend has visited and is 
convinced that his friend’s counsels would bring succour to the King, as well as help 
Hythlodaios himself to a more privileged position. However, Hythlodaios begs to differ. He 
has no desire to own things -- his possessions he gave away to relatives -- and he refuses to 
be a slave to kings. With his life he is content; any and all striving after the favours of those 
in power he will leave to others. 
 However, the attitude to politics exhibited by Hythlodaios, a man fully devoted to 
philosophy, goes quite contrary to the opinion of Thomas More. On this point, More agrees 
with Giles and advocates the view that a shared effort of the philosopher and the politician is 
a meaningful and useful thing to promote. While More esteems Hythlodaios’s lack of interest 
in property, he believes that by taking a step back in some areas for the sake of public interest 
Hythlodaios would help realize the essence of philosophy. For he would do public good by 
inducing the ruler to “just and noble actions” (p. 53). The confrontation of More’s and 
Hythlodaios’s respective views as to the relationship between philosophy and politics, 
formed on the paradigm of the debate on the best arrangement of the community in Plato’s 
Republic,20  brings up some points of contention -- such as the influence exercised by the 
                                                                                                                                                    
Robynson, edited with an introduction, by D. H. Sacks, Boston – New York 1999, p. 134. 
20 Even though both Hythlodaios and More refer to Plato on this occasion, each points to a different idea: 
while Hythlodaios has in mind the role of the philosopher who refuses to take part in political matters, as this 
philosopher on the ruler; the question of the essence of state and of humanity; the task of 
philosophy; and also the issue of equal property and the role played by private and common 
ownership -- and also illuminates the preliminary assumptions of the two opposite stances. 
 
a) Is there a place for philosophy at the ruler’s court? 
The first of the debated points, namely the philosopher’s involvement in politics, is treated by 
Hythlodaios in a relatively long speech, interrupted by a brief polemics with More. In the first 
part -- a re-enactment of the presentation that took place at Cardinal John Morton’s during 
Hythlodaios’s stay in England -- Hythlodaios lists his objections against the understanding of 
law and justice prevalent in England, in particular against the “just” use of capital punishment 
for thiefs and against the role of money, as it is put at the same level with human life.21 
However, the reactions to his original lecture were almost all negative. With the exception of 
the Cardinal,22 not a single one among those present expressed at least limited support for 
Hythlodaios’s proposed novelties. Hythlodaios concludes there is no reason why he, a 
philosopher, should advise rulers, given that his views are not appreciated in the least. 
Yet Hythlodaios’s experience with the response of the courtiers will not induce More 
to change his mind about the role of philosophy in politics. He remains convinced that in 
giving counsel, the philosopher “would do very much good”. He also recalls the words 
written by Hythlodaios’s favourite Plato in Book V of the Republic (473d),23  namely, that 
the state will attain happiness only once the ruler becomes a philosopher or the philosopher a 
ruler (p. 83), and adds that to contribute by counsel would suffice. Hythlodaios, who agrees 
only with the first part,  believes that the current rulers are in no mood to listen to the “good 
                                                                                                                                                    
would make him participate in lawless actions, More recalls, rather, the essential character of philosophy as a 
participant in political matters (for which see below, p. 12). For similarities between Plato’s Republic and 
Book I of More’s Utopia cf. e.g. Colin Starnes, The New Republic, Waterloo 1990. The issue whether in the 
Republic, Plato presents his own vision of the best arrangement of the community, or rather criticizes it, will 
not be further treated here; cf. the author’s papers mentioned in n. 17. 
21 The same penalty -- i.e., the capital punishment -- is dealt to both murderers and thieves. Hythlodaios sees 
causes of thievery not only in lack of proper education from a very slender age, but also in bad economic 
conditions (More: Utopia, ed. by G. M. Logan et al., pp. 65-67). 
22 Even though the Cardinal did not adopt Hythlodaios’s part unambiguously, he left open the possibility of 
further discussion about his proposals.  
23 At several places, More-the-author refers to Plato’s Republic, in Hythlodaios’s view a paradigm of the utopian 
way of life. On pp. 43-45 it is stated: „[Hythlodaios] sailing has not been like that of Palinurus, but more that of 
Ulysses, or rather of  Plato“; on pp. 81-83 Plato is stated to be a model for Hythlodaios („Your friend Plato thinks 
that commonwealths will be happy only when philosophers become kings or kings become philosophers...“); on 
p. 101 Hythlodaios identifies with Plato’s views as expressed in the Republic; on p. 101 he claims he agrees with 
counsels” of the philosophers, as their whole education was directed at a completely different 
understanding of the purpose of governance then the one presented by philosophers. The only 
way to bring about some change would be for princes to start philosophizing. 
 This brief polemical debate highlights a diversity in the notion of what makes a ruler 
a ruler. According to Hythlodaios, the proper arrangement of society will be set up only once 
the ruler turns philosopher -- for unless this happens, the prince will not obey the “good 
counsels” or “wholesome decrees” (decreta sana) of the philosopher. On the other hand, in 
More’s view the realization of a prosperous state is not anchored in the notion of the 
philosopher-king; rather, it depends on the capacities of the person who counsels the ruler, 
i.e., of the philosopher as councillor. In order for the ruler to obey the philosopher’s 
“wholesome decrees”, the philosopher must choose an appropriate approach. In such a case, 
the distinction between the philosopher and the ruler remains intact. 
 
b) The essential nature of the state and of humanity 
The “appropriate approach” that the philosopher ought to adopt turns up in the following 
point of discussion, i.e., the essential nature of the state and of humanity as well as their 
mutual relationship. Here Hythlodaios lists examples from the court of France so as to 
demonstrate what he means by wholesome decrees for the state. They include the avoidance 
of expansive policies, as these bring more worries than profits. The ruler’s aim ought to be 
life in peace and care of his subjects that attains visibility in their mutual love to one another. 
Another “wholesome decree” is a reform of the attitude to money, and to wealth in general. 
Rather than trying to amass the maximum of personal riches, the ruler should strive to make 
his people wealthy. The people chooses a ruler in order to live well, not to assure a 
prosperous life for the ruler. In this sense, the ruler ought to rule over “the wealthy and well-
to-do”, not over beggars. The third decree concerns governance, in that the ruler ought to 
apply the law and keep criminality at bay. 
Hythlodaios’s decrees present a new view of the nature and purpose of the state, both 
in that the good of the state is identified here with the good of the people rather than that of 
the ruler and in that one assumes the ruler ought to rule for the others rather than for himself, 
or that he ought to subject the well-off and not the poor. As a matter of fact, it is a reversal of 
                                                                                                                                                    
an idea of Plato. On p. 181 it is stated that Utopians knew all Plato’s works. 
the world where the ruler rules for his own profit.24 However, the prospects of making this 
“good world” real begin to crumble once we pursue them at the court of a ruler whose 
convictions are quite different. Here there is a rare moment of agreement between 
Hythlodaios and More, as More assents that to give “good” counsels to rulers whose beliefs 
are quite contrary is like “telling tales to the deaf”.25 However, the two disputants interpret 
the simile very differently. For Hythlodaios, the simile implies lack of interest in 
philosophical counsels on the part of the ruler, and this is a crucial reason why Hythlodaios 
refuses to take part in political matters. On the other hand, More deduces from the simile that 
it is quite pointless to tell the ruler certain things, if we know that his convictions are different 
and that he will not accept these views, so that our effort would come to nought. One must 
know which things one can tell him and how they ought to be presented. 
In order to illustrate the difference of views in more detail, More offers another 
simile, when he compares Hythlodaios’s insistence on the realization of his “wholesome 
decrees” to a typical scene from a Plautus comedy: a philosopher steps in front of babbling 
slaves and begins to intone a passage from the Roman tragedy Octavia which depicts a 
confrontation between Nero and Seneca, the emperor advocating cruelty and arbitrariness, the 
erudite calling for prudence and self-control.26 The effect of the situation is a mixture of 
tragedy and comedy, for the simple reason that two completely different things are mixed 
together. When a particular dramatic piece is acted out, the goal is to perform it the best, 
which, according to the principles of the theory of drama, means that one ought not to add 
into the mixture just any thing at hand, whatever its intrinsic quality. Similarly, a beautiful 
whole can be formed only by putting together those parts that are proper.27 What follows 
hence for every state where the good and evil are mixed, is that its optimal arrangement 
cannot be attained by following Hythlodaios’s requests and introducing into the community 
elements of a world based on complete elimination of evil as well as exclusive rule of the 
good, for this would create an improper mixture of things. 
For More, however, a good arrangement can be established in an indirect way 
                                                 
24 The alternative that one takes into account the prosperity of the people as well as that of the ruler is implicitly 
included in More’s stance. Cf. More’s idea of an indirect course of action and of treating things appropriately. 
25 „they would turn deaf ears to me“, More: Utopia, ed. by G. M. Logan et al., tr. R. M. Adams, p. 95. 
26 The issue of authorship remains unresolved. For a long time, the text was attributed to Seneca. 
27 Cf. Plato’s example of the painted sculpture in the Republic (420c-d): the goal is not for it to have the best 
colours at the best parts, but rather to be beautiful as a whole. 
(obliquus ductus), where everything is treated adequately and appropriately (virili omnia 
tractes commode) (p. 96). It follows from More’s speech that the “indirect course” of action 
assumes the human community to be both good and evil. And the same is true of a particular 
human being: every person is both good and evil, too, having been burdened by the original 
sin, and whatever a human does, their action will never be purely good; rather, it will be both 
good and evil. The only exception would be for a human to turn angel -- but then, that person 
would no longer be human.28 In the human condition, a person cannot effect the good fully, or 
in all cases, and unless one is willing to become a dogmatic skeptic, one chooses the solution 
where the outcome of human action is not the absolute good, but a good nonetheless. 
Concerning one’s attitude to the ruler, the effect will be the indirect course of action, as 
mentioned above. The reason this course is “indirect” consists in the fact that the ruler is not 
presented with matters directly and openly; rather, one proceeds from evil towards a lesser 
evil. This action being “adequate and appropriate” means that it takes into account the 
singular nature of the situation and that it keeps in view not only the conditions of the 
subjects of government but also those of its holder. Thus, under this method of realizing the 
good, it is necessary, first, to opt for the realization of the good, and then, to strive for the 
least amount of evil in the world. For More, the persistence of evil in the world is a challenge 
captured by the image of a voyage on troubled seas: 
 “don’t give up the ship in a storm just because you cannot hold back the winds” (p. 
97). 
 
Hythlodaios will not accept the “indirect way” of resolving things, as he recognizes only two, 
mutually contrary options: Either the good is realized fully, or not at all. 
If Hythlodaios and More differ in their views of the state, it is because they hold 
different concepts of the essential nature of human life and of the goals to be pursued by the 
human community. While for Hythlodaios, the essential nature of human beings is the good, 
and the goal of the state is a return into the Golden Age, More assumes a culpable humanity 
whose life is set within the precariousness of the situation, one that the community strives to 
resolve by means of a prudent and balanced way of life. A comparison of these conclusions 
                                                 
28 Cf. K. Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage, München 1979. 
with Carl Schmitt’s ideas in The Concept of the Political,29 where he declares the ultimate 
basis of political considerations to be not the state, but rather “the element of the political” 
(das Politische), created by the duality between friend and enemy, will allow us to see a 
correspondence between the dualities of good--evil and friend--enemy, as well as between 
precariousness and the political. The assumption, held by More, of a persistent tension 
between good and evil can then be interpreted as the basis of the political sphere; on the other 
hand, the striving for an eternally durable good that would eliminate all societal tensions 
including the constitutive ones, as pursued by Hythlodaios, is clearly an instance of rejecting 
the political as the essence of the state. 
 
c) The two different philosophical point of departure 
The differing answers to the question of the essence of the state and humanity stem from 
differences in one’s philosophical understanding of the world. Hythlodaios’s obstinate 
insistence that there is no place for philosophy at rulers’ courts is, claims More, based on the 
scholastic way of philosophizing - as we already mentioned in the introduction -, a method 
that is typical for a group of friends but useless for a debate with a ruler. In advising a ruler, a 
completely different philosophical approach needs to be employed, one which More 
characterizes, as we have just mentioned, as an indirect course of action, obliquus ductus. 
Such a course is derived from the insight that to achieve general good in the world is an 
impossibility and that not all evil can be converted into good, so that the task in front of us is 
to try and convert bigger evil into a lesser evil. 
Hythlodaios’s philosophy, which employs the methods of Scholasticism, is construed 
on the notion that “everything fits everywhere” (quae quidvis putet ubivis convenire, p. 94), 
or in other words, that there is one truth only and it ought to be applied whatever the 
circumstances. Hythlodaios assumes that the philosopher knows “in advance”, independently 
of the situation, what the good is -- which is then merely realized, in a “mechanical” manner, 
in various situations. In thinking so, Hythlodaios forgets that only the particular situation 
gives shape and form to our actions. Once we leave the situation aside, we end up rejecting 
its precariousness, and thus we reduce “all” situation to a single one. For this “single” 
situation, then, a “single” good is sufficient. 
                                                 
29 C. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, Berlin 1996, p. 20. 
However, besides this philosophy there is “another”, one that “knows its stage and is 
able to adapt to it” (p. 97). It is here that More claims to belong. Such a philosophy 
recognizes the situation in its particularity and acknowledges its precariousness. Following 
the comparison with a Plautus comedy, one can say that such philosophy is essentially unable 
to insert something improper into the situation, something contrary to the situation’s 
character, be it as good as it may. In particular, a situation characterized by precariousness 
will not allow us to realize ideas taken over from a world based on assumptions that are 
purely good, or on a single all-powerful truth, pure to the core. 
In the background of More’s philosophy we find a notion of humanity whose 
essential feature is to be set in a situation that is problematic, precarious. This means that 
humans are unable to solve the issues with which they wrangle once for all and 
unambiguously, as these issues come up in new situations all the time. It is not within human 
powers and capacities to master and control the immense plurality of circumstances and 
potential views at each issue. In order to be able of a decision, a human person simplifies 
situations by neglecting some of their aspects, even though one is quite well aware of them -- 
the reason being most often that one holds them unimportant. 
Hythlodaios’s notion of a good world simplifies the human condition just as well; 
however, it does so in an essential manner, one that More has to refuse, for it completely 
ignores a crucial feature of situation: its precariousness. This would resemble the state of 
absolute freedom when human life is ridden of all obstacles including fortuity. We encounter 
here a characteristic of most utopian visions. They implicitly assume that humans are afraid, 
terrified by incapacity to master and control the complexity of the situation, the human 
condition one lives in, as it originates from human imperfection and culpability. On this 
ground one proceeds to view the situation reductively, simplify it and rid it of fortuity, so that 
one could master it rationally and plan one’s own existence. If, on the contrary, one accepts 
the precariousness of the human condition, life remains pervaded by tensions that stem not 
only by the uncontrollable plurality of circumstances but also from the impossibility to 
determine unambiguously, in a world structured by both good and evil, what is actually good. 
Accordingly, the role of the philosopher differs in each framework. In Hythlodaios’s view, a 
philosopher-king implements a notion of the good that is given in advance; however, if the 
philosopher does not rule and yet participates in a public life that does not bring the notion of 
the good to a full implementation, he helps mask a wrongful way of life, and turns wretched 
himself in consequence. If he intends to save his reputation, there is no other way but retreat 
from political existence and live in seclusion. This is how Hythlodaios sees the issue, and 
therefore he is unwilling to become a councillor of rulers. Hythlodaios’s inspiration here is 
Plato’s Republic, 496d, where Socrates mentions as an example the philosopher who refuses 
to take part in injustice. Since on his own he is unable to suppress it, and since he does not 
desire to die before his time, he withdraws from the public sphere and strives to live his life 
without participating in unfair actions. However, this means that the philosopher abstains 
from any participation in the matters of the community, and his approach to the communal 
process diverges sharply from the attitude of the philosopher depicted in Book VII of the 
Republic, who “returns into the cave” so as to help his co-citizens tell falsity from the truth, 
notwithstanding the fact that this may cost him his life (cf. 517a). Remaining “outside” of the 
community and here waiting for the “right” time when he could realize the ideas of 
philosophy and the good, Hythlodaios turns contrary to the basic notion of Plato’s Republic, 
which is to say, the philosopher’s essential care of the community. Hythlodaios defends his 
own attitude by claiming that “human foolery” being impossible to cure, he attempts to save, 
at least, himself.30  
According to More, the philosopher adopts an “indirect” way, and step by step, he 
reaches smaller and smaller evil. Such an attitude does not oblige the philosopher to share the 
rulers’ views and turn into an “assistant of foolery”, as Hythlodaios believes; quite on the 
contrary. Having chosen the good, the philosopher will strive to make the ruler change 
opinion and this in an “indirect way”, rather than in a direct confrontation with a world-view 
totally contradictory to the one he holds himself. 
 
 
d) Justice and property 
Another area where the difference in assessing the role of good and evil in the world shows 
up is the conception of justice. Wherever there is private property and everything is measured 
by means of money, it is impossible, claims Hythlodaios, to establish a just social 
                                                 
30 In such a situation, Hythlodaios sees no room for a philosopher, as he is afraid that, more likely, the wicked 
would influence the philosopher, rather than that the philosopher himself would in an indirect manner have impact 
on the wicked and make them better. 
arrangement. By a just social arrangement Hythlodaios means a state of society where the 
best things are not channeled to the worst of people, where property is not distributed only 
among a small group of individuals, and where a few are not privileged at the disadvantage of 
many who plod in poverty. In a fair constitution, virtue is respected and in terms of 
possessions everyone is sufficient. The only way to happiness leads via equal property, as 
Hythlodaios sees it traced in Plato’s Republic.31  
More’s objections against common ownership are quick to come and are almost 
identical to those formulated by Aristotle in Book II of the Politics (1261a10-1264b25). The 
abolishing of private ownership would rid the human existence of motivation and there would 
be no way of assuring a sufficient amount of material possessions. Everybody would rest 
their hopes with the others and do nothing themselves. As property would belong to nobody 
as much as to everybody, nobody would take care of it. The appointing of offices would be 
meaningless, as these would lack all respect and esteem. Nor would people esteem other 
people, for everybody would be pretty much the same.32  
A debate about property will arise also in the conclusion of the whole book, after 
Hythlodaios has described the arrangements on Utopia which he holds for best, as well as the 
only ones that merit the title of commonwealth. On the island, everything belongs to 
everybody and noone misses privacy. The aim is to live without worries, with a joyful, serene 
mind, untroubled by fears about one’s subsistence. This is claimed to be genuine justice. Its 
basis is equality -- both in terms of propery and of human nature. The sameness of human 
nature steps in place of the social contract (p. 201). On Utopia, there is neither any longing 
for money nor criminality -- which, together with quarrels, fights and rebellions, is primarily 
caused by money. By abolishing money, one eliminates all the negative phenomena, 
including poverty. Yet the deepest cause of all human misery is judged by Hythlodaios to lie 
in human pride, which he calls a “monster, the prime plague and begetter of all others” (p. 
247). The Utopians have uprooted it and destroyed, thus laying base to a state that will endure 
forever.  
                                                 
31 See More: Utopia, ed. by G. M. Logan et al., p. 101. He admits that poverty can be alleviated but not 
completely eliminated, unless private property be abolished, too. 
32 To counter these objections, Hythlodaios has only one argument available: his own experience. Throughout the 
book, his argument draws persuasive power only from his own personal experience – which, however, Giles and 
More lack, since they have not visited Utopia and never will (as no-one, not even Hythlodaios, know where it is 
situated). 
In response to the way of life depicted here, More in his commentary cites the same 
objections as he did at the end of Part I. To begin with, he rejects the most important aspect of 
the Utopian way of life, to wit, communitarian existence and economy without money. 
According to More, such arrangements shatter all dignity, majesty, grandness and stateliness, 
which the public opinion holds to be the true ornaments and decorations of the state. About a 
number of other features More is even convinced that they are absurd. Although he would be 
content to see some aspects of the Utopian commonwealth transposed into his own 




In conclusion, let us come back to parts of our argument. To begin with, let us ask: what is 
the philosopher to do at times when everyone commits injustice? Should he, single-handed, 
come forth and defend fairness? Or should he rather lie in wait for a better time, when it will 
be easier for him to realize his proposals for a well-ordered state? For Hythlodaios the 
philosopher, one who has concluded that there is no interest in philosophical counsels, the 
only available solution is to remain outside of the political process. More, on the contrary, 
opts for participation in political matters -- and this not only in the Utopia but in his personal 
life as well. In doing so, he relies on the assumption that humans are burdened by guilt and 
simultaneously responsible for their actions and for the shape their state is in. In a situation 
that will not allow to tell the ruler directly, More thus opts for an “indirect course” of 
influencing the prince, striving to improve the circumstances.  
The Utopian community, a representation of a world bare of evil, is also a community 
of friends, for similarly to the Epicurean Garden it eliminates a basic feature of the political 
community, to wit, eris or polemos.33 It is inhabited only by friends who do not quarrel and 
do not clash, which makes away with the need for laws and courts. One’s view of the role of 
the philosopher in the community and of the significance of private and public property will 
be necessarily an outcome of whether one believes the essential nature of the state to be 
friendship, but rather polemos -- or in other words, the good only, or rather good and evil. 
If Hythlodaios pushes for the idea of an all-governing good, this stems from his effort 
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to break loose from a power that transcends him and escapes his control, to wit, the 
precariousness of the situation. He finds a way out in positing a “simplified”, a non-
precarious situation -- not realizing how problematic this step is. For it rids human beings of 
desire, effort and respect. No longer responsible for anything, they become part and parcel of 
a mechanically functioning world where they are manipulated in accordance with the needs 
of the highest principle, which is Reason.34 In the final outcome, they lose their own self -- 
just like in dogmatic Scholasticism, where everything is set up and decided in advance. 
On the other hand, More’s world, one full of changes and transmuting situations, puts 
human beings in front of challenges, makes them active, induces them to pursue the truth and 
allows them to achieve dignity by opting for the good and subsequently, step by step, 
proceeding from a bigger to a lesser evil, strive for a realization of the good within a world 
that is structured by both good and evil. Without the precariousness of the situation, a person 
would turn into a mere executor of truths given in advance, one who lives -- just like the 
Utopians -- uprooted from space, time and tradition. The only link to “tradition” would be the 
expectations of a return of the Golden Age. 
So if the question is whether More’s Utopia is utopian, we have to answer in the 
negative. It is true that the author of Utopia is favourable to the notion of the social good, 
but not of goodness supreme and pervasive, one realized in the form of common ownership, 
equal distribution of property, equal nature and strict supervision over all members of the 
community, one that rids human life of motivation and interest as well as the desire to 
know, or indeed, to philosophize. More believes that the good ought to be realized by the 
effort, put up by every single individual, to lessen the amount of evil in the world.  
                                                 
34 “Now above all reason urges us to love and venerate the Divine Majesty” (p. 163). 
